Category Archives: Recursos Minerais

Las causas de la guerra: más allá de la barbarie y la codicia

Por: EL PAÍS 23 de noviembre de 2012

Autor invitado: Oscar Mateos (*)

La explicación de las guerras en el continente africano se ha fundamentado muchas veces en tópicos y clichés. Es habitual encontrarnos con medios de comunicación que reducen la complejidad histórica, económica, sociopolítica y sociocultural de todo un conflicto a una cuestión de “recursos naturales” o de “enfrentamientos tribales”. Las razones para ello parecen obvias: sintetizar la explicación de una guerra en el escaso espacio que proporciona el medio de comunicación en cuestión, para quien la realidad africana ocupa un espacio marginal; necesidad de dar masticada la información para que sea inteligible, hasta el punto que queda desvirtuada y totalmente descontextualizada, o bien porque el periodista, como muchas veces el trabajador humanitario, va saltando de conflicto en conflicto, sin capacidad ni tiempo para adentrarse en los libros y análisis que explican la compleja realidad del país.

Sierra leona fotografía de Kadir van Lohuizen

Imagen de Kadir van Lohuizen incluída en la exposición ‘Comercio de diamantes’, vía Tania Adam.

Pero este no es un problema circunscrito a los medios de comunicación. En el ámbito académico, se produjo desde la década de los noventa un intenso debate entre dos narrativas monocausales que competían por explicar las causas últimas de los conflictos. Por una parte, la narrativa del “nuevo barbarismo”, como algunos autores críticos la denominaron, trató de demostrar que los conflictos africanos se explicaban por una combinación de factores identitarios (“luchas tribales”), de colapso de los gobiernos locales y de escasez de recursos y presión demográfica. Autores como Thomas Homer-Dixon o el periodista estadounidense Robert Kaplan, abanderaron dicho discurso.

El propio Kaplan, con su obra La anarquía que viene (The Coming Anarchy) en 1994, analizaba conflictos como el de Sierra Leona de la siguiente forma:

“[…] la guerra no es tanto un medio sino un fin en sí misma (…) Sierra Leona es un microcosmos de lo que está ocurriendo (…) en el resto de África Occidental y del mundo subdesarrollado: la caída de los gobiernos centrales, el auge de los dominios tribales y regionales, la incontrolada expansión de las enfermedades y la omnipresencia de la guerra”

Ante este discurso, surgió poco después la narrativa de “la maldición de los recursos”. Uno de sus principales defensores fue el economista Paul Collier, quien consideraba que la presencia de recursos naturales en contextos caracterizados por la pobreza y la falta de oportunidades eran los elementos determinantes para explicar la guerra en África. Collier, muy influyente con sus ideas en el Banco Mundial, puso en el centro del debate la idea de la “codicia” de los actores de la guerra, como principal motor de la violencia, relativizando la importancia de los posibles agravios socioeconómicos o del peso de la historia. Los diamantes en Sierra Leona, la extracción del coltán en la República Democrática del Congo, la madera en Liberia o el petróleo en Nigeria, serían, según esta visión, los principales argumentos para explicar el por qué de la violencia en estos países. Ambos discursos, el del “nuevo barbarismo” y el de la “maldición de los recursos naturales”, a pesar de enfatizar aspectos diferentes, coincidían en una cosa: considerar los conflictos africanos como post-ideológicos.

Tanto en el ámbito periodístico como en el académico se ha avanzando mucho en este sentido. En el primero, parecen existir medios de comunicación y periodistas cada vez más sensibilizados con la necesidad de subrayar la complejidad de la guerra y de huir de tópicos que no ayudan a entender un contexto en cuestión, sino todo lo contrario. Existen nuevos espacios de discusión, como este propio blog, en el que se da pie a exponer la multicausalidad existente en cualquier conflicto. En el ámbito académico, numerosos autores críticos, como es el caso de Mark Duffield o de Christopher Cramer, han tratado de superar el reduccionismo de ambos discursos. Sin duda, los factores identitarios, aquellos relacionados con la trayectoria del estado post-colonial africano o bien con la extracción de recursos son importantes para explicar la génesis y desarrollo de un conflicto, pero éstos, por sí solos, no explican nada. Los conflictos africanos, como el del resto de regiones del planeta, por lo tanto, son multicausales.

Esta es precisamente una de las tesis de fondo de un reciente libro coordinado por la politóloga Itziar Ruíz-Giménez y publicado por Edicions Bellaterra. Con el título “Más allá de la barbarie y la codicia”, esta obra pretende contribuir al debate sobre la complejidad de los conflictos en África Subsahariana.

Port-MAS ALLA DL BABARIEEl libro analiza los debates académicos existentes en las últimas dos décadas(capítulos de Raquel Ferrao yMaría Serrano) o la visión de los medios de comunicación(José Carlos Sendín), a través del análisis detallado de casos concretos como los de Angola(Karlos Pérez de Armiño),Liberia (Mayra Moro-Coco),Sierra Leona (Oscar Mateos),República Democrática del Congo (Mbuyi Kabunda),Somalia (Itziar Ruíz-Giménez) oSudán (Aleksi Ylönen). Además de insistir en la complejidad de los conflictos, el libro subraya otro aspecto fundamental: para entender los conflictos africanos no es suficiente una mirada local, sino que es imprescindible entender la dinámicas regionales, internacionales y transnacionales. Por poner sólo un ejemplo, el papel de las empresas multinacionales de extracción de recursos como el coltán o el de las empresas de seguridad privada han sido y son cruciales en conflictos como el de Sierra Leona o el de la República Democrática del Congo.

Y es que la deconstrucción de los discursos monocausales es más importante de lo que parece. El impacto de narrativas como las del “nuevo barbarismo” o la “maldición de los diamantes” ha influenciado enormemente el imaginario social, hasta el punto que ha determinado muchas veces las decisiones políticas. Entender la guerra en África como un problema estrictamente local y despolitizado ha derivado en políticas cada vez más basadas en la seguridad y de defensa de la supuesta amenaza que esto pueda representar para los intereses o la integridad física de un país en cuestión. Esta“securitización” de las soluciones puede observarse en las políticas migratorias o de lucha contra el terrorismo. Precisamente, y por entrar al debate en el que este mismo blog participó hace unos meses, campañas como la de “Kony 2012”refuerzan esa visión simplista (“el problema es Joseph Kony y basta”) y desoluciones militarizadas (“el problema se acaba si le detenemos”) que demuestran que es necesario seguir insistiendo en la complejidad de los conflictos.

En definitiva, para entender lo que sucede en el norte de Uganda, actualmente en el este de la República Democrática del Congo, en el Delta del Níger en Nigeria o en Somalia es imprescindible recurrir a la historia, a la complejidad sociopolítica y sociocultural, pero también, a las dinámicas de poder existentes a nivel global, al papel deficitario de organismos internacionales como Naciones Unidas y a las interacciones entre nuestros hábitos de consumo (móviles, tablets, petróleo, etc.) y las dinámicas de la violencia. Es imprescindible ir “más allá de la barbarie y la codicia”, no sólo por honestidad intelectual, sino también porque las soluciones no tienen tanto que ver con una cuestión de “seguridad” sino esencialmente de justicia social y global.

“Más allá de la barbarie y la codicia” se presenta en Madrid el 26 de noviembre (La Casa Encendida, 19.00) con la participación de Itziar Ruíz-Giménez, Alfonso Armada (periodista) y Jesús Núñez (Co-director del IECAH)].

(*) Oscar Mateos es profesor de la Universitat Ramón Llull, miembro del Grupo de Estudios Africanos (GEA) de la UAM.
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The Causes of the Sierra Leone Civil War

The Causes of the Sierra Leone Civil War

By  on October 25, 2012 

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 ‘The root of the conflict is and remains

diamonds, diamonds and diamonds.’

(Ibrahim Kamara 2000)

 

‘To the economist, this is war motivated by greed.

For the young fighter, it is injustice.’

(William Reno 2003, p. 46)

 

I. Introduction

The decade-long civil war in Sierra Leone formally ended in January 2002 following the British government’s successful military intervention to suppress rebel insurgents. However, the conflict has not completely finished yet; some features of brutality and viciousness in the conflict are still lingering in the minds and bodies of Sierra Leoneans. The recent trial of former Liberian president, Charles Taylor, clearly reveals the indelible scars left to people even ten years after the official declaration of end of the war. After he was found guilty of ‘aiding and abetting the war crimes during the Sierra Leone civil war’ in the UN-backed Special Court for Sierra Leone on April 26 2012, one victim, whose forearms were amputated during the war, indignantly talked to the BBC: ‘Taylor deserves 100 years in jail for his role in the atrocities’ (BBC April 26 2012).

The forced recruitment of child soldiers by the Revolutionary United Front (henceforth the RUF) and the rebels’ atrocious behaviour against civilians are the most frequently featured aspects of this war. Indeed, vast numbers of Sierra Leone children were conscripted into the conflict by both parties – the RUF and the Sierra Leone government forces. Yet no precise number of abducted children has been confirmed, and estimated figures vary according to agencies. For instance, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) estimated that 10,000 children were involved in various fighting forces, and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) indicated that 6,000 children were forced into violence over the years (TRC 2004). One UNICEF report also shows that 8466 children was officially documented as missing between 1991 and 2002 with 4448 children missing solely in 1999 (Williamson 2006).[i] In addition, more than 50,000 people appear to have been killed whilst almost two-thirds of the total population in Sierra Leone was displaced (Gberie 2005). These figures do not properly show the actual agony and resentment of those victims, though. Up to today, a huge number of Sierra Leoneans including former child soldiers are still enduring pains in their souls and bodies.

The dreadful result of the war, both in figures and in reality, makes us wonder why this war broke out. Some economic literature asserts that civil wars are more likely to be motivated by opportunities of economic profit (greed), than by political and social dissatisfaction (grievance). This assumption about the primary role of economic opportunities appears plausible to explain the persistence or escalation of civil wars. However, one can doubt whether there is a strong correlation between the motivation of greed and civil war onset. In addition, some scholars and journalists disregard historical and political contexts in which civil wars occur and then describe the wars merely as products of less politics, more criminality or environmental collapse.[ii] The atrocities committed during the war were also portrayed as evidence of a mysterious and mindless rebel movement without legitimate political grievances. These one-sided or abstract approaches provide a limited picture of what really happened.

In order to explore more complex causes of civil wars deeply rooted in society, this paper will examine the case of the Sierra Leone Civil War. Instead of covering the whole period of the civil war, this paper will focus on the pre-war period to show the causes of civil war onset. For the subsequent stage of civil wars is more likely influenced by diverse political and economic interests differing from the initial drivers of the conflict.

Section II briefly provides an overview of the scholarly debates regarding economic causes of civil wars and then explains why the Sierra Leone civil war does not entirely correspond to the arguments of the existing economic literature. Rather than using a single-dimensional approach such as focusing on diamond resources, the main focus of this paper will be placed on the interaction between structure and agency. Section III traces the political and social circumstances (structure) of Sierra Leone from its colonial period until 1991 which increased discontent among its population. However, the structural problems do not solely account for the causes of the war. Growing grievances in the pre-war period paved the way for the birth of the RUF (agency), the main rebel group which initially triggered theSierra Leone civil war. In this context, Section IV addresses the history of the emergence of the RUF, and then traces their motivations and sources of external support which paved the way for the war to come.

II. Economic Causes of Civil Wars and Sierra Leone

‘Greed’ and Its Critics

Why do civil wars occur? A number of scholars have addressed this topic; in particular, econometric literature in recent years tends to place much emphasis on material aspects of civil wars. Among others, Collier (2000, pp.91 & 96) claims that ‘conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by grievance,’ and ‘grievance-based explanations of civil war are so seriously wrong’, which is backed by the three major findings of his research: the exports of primary commodities, the number of young men and low education levels are positively correlated with the frequency of civil war outbreak. His later research with Hoeffler (2004) also reaches a similar conclusion supported by some newly added proxies: the risk of civil war outbreak is also likely increased in cases of the existence of large diaspora, a low per capita income, a low growth rate, a dispersed population and finally a higher population in total. Furthermore, Collier (2000) argues that the aspects of grievances are not readily involved in the making of civil wars mainly because of a collective action problem. He notes that while citizens may wish to see the government overthrown in order to have more justice, they may not have any interest in personally joining the rebellion. Rebellious groups are usually fragmented, which diminish the likelihood of reaching the goal of greater justice. In addition to this, people may be reluctant to join the rebellion when expected benefits may take years to be realized.

This argument has triggered a variety of scholarly debates. First, Fearon (2005, p.483), who used the same data as Collier and Hoeffler, has found that the research findings of Collier and Hoeffler become fragile, merely by ‘minor changes in the sample framing and the recovery of missing data’. Unlike Collier and Hoeffler, he asserts that the impact of primary commodity exports is not sufficiently significant in provoking civil wars. On the other hand, countries with high oil production are more prone to conflicts. It is not because oil offers higher financial incentives for potential rebels; it is more likely that oil-dependent countries have ‘weaker state institutions than other countries with the same per capita income’ (Fearon 2005, pp. 487, 490-491 & 503-504). Bates (2008, pp. 10-11) also supports Fearon’s argument while noting ‘a disparity between the evidence from cross-national regressions and that from qualitative accounts’. Last but not least, to reassess Collier’s latest ‘greed’ argument, Keen (2008) provides several critical points based on a dubious selection of proxies, a lack of attention to political goals, and the interaction of greed , grievance and the state.

Since Sierra Leone was a country with a massive diamond reserve, the competition for seizing control of lucrative diamond-producing regions has been widely regarded as a main cause of the conflict. Did the ‘resource curse’ – the ‘diamond curse’ in the case of Sierra Leone – provoke the decade-long bloody war there? Collier did not include diamonds and gems in his econometric analysis (Fearon 2005), so there is no clear evidence about how diamonds have contributed to the civil war outbreak in his cross-national research.

It is notable that Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore (2005) examine the impact of diamonds on civil war onset and incidence (or prevalence). They argue that easily exploitable secondary diamonds are positively correlated to the onset and incidence of ethnic war, whereas primary diamonds (mainly Kimberlite) affect them less likely because mining primary diamonds necessitates more stable and strong state systems. However, this quantitative research also fails to account for the relationship between diamonds and the civil war outbreak in Sierra Leone. The diamond mining industry in Sierra Leone was based both on primary and secondary diamonds (Lujala, Gleditsch & Gilmore 2005) and the Sierra Leone civil war was not rooted in ethnic rivalry either (Bangura 2004). Hence, even in the economic literature, it is still an unsubstantiated argument that the huge diamond reserve in Sierra Leone was the initial driver of the decade-long conflict.

Sierra Leone and its Diamonds

Despite the lack of evidence of the diamonds’ role in initiating the civil war, it is quite clear that diamonds played an essential part in the war by offering the RUF an invaluable funding source to sustain its warfare. With the growing interests of both parties – the RUF and government soldiers – in illegal diamond-mining, battles often occurred over diamond-abundant areas (Keen 2008). The RUF is estimated to have made an approximate profit of 200 million dollars a year between 1991 and 1999 through the illicit diamond trade. These illicit diamonds are widely known to have been traded with Charles Taylor in return for arms and ammunitions, which were later falsely identified as Liberian in origin and then legitimately exported abroad (Stohl 2000).

Although diamonds played a significant role in financing the war, this factor solely cannot explain the initial intention of actors involved in the conflict. Rather, some of the problems caused by the abundant diamond reserve are more useful to explain the structural inequality in Sierra Leonean society which later fed into the war. For instance, unequal benefits arising from diamond extraction were augmented as the ownership of diamond mines and mining licenses had been mostly given to the ruling families and loyal supporters of the ruling regimes. Thus, this economic inequality led to growing frustration among the population who were excluded from the benefits. To make matters worse, the Sierra Leone government was not able to properly collect tax from the diamond sector. The low purchase price of the Government Diamond Office (GDO) encouraged smuggling and, as a result, failed to increase tax revenues necessary for empowering civil sectors including armies (Keen 2008).

In order to argue that there was a direct and clear connection between diamonds and motivations of the war, it is necessary to substantiate that the first priority of the RUF’s war aims was to secure diamond mines for gaining a huge commercial profit beyond the necessity of equipping themselves with weapons. The RUF did not demonstrate such an obvious aim in the beginning of the war, though. Rather, as Reno (2003b) asserts, it is more likely that universal assumptions on the relationship between natural resources and motivations in conflict do not thoroughly explain diverse evolutions of conflicts. Therefore, instead of simply laying all the blame on the greed for diamonds, this paper intends to examine the broader and unique political and societal context of Sierra Leone which created the circumstances for the invasion of the RUF in 1991.

III. History of ‘Grievance’

The history of Sierra Leone is a product of mixed grievances from its colonial period. A two-class society with a weak bureaucracy was established during British colonial rule, thereby sowing the seeds for the later popular discontents. Post-colonial mismanagement, particularly in the government of Siaka Stevens (1967-1984), even made the already weak state system completely collapse. As a consequence, the young population both in cities and rural areas became even more marginalised from their society, without access to proper education and employment. This fuelled political and economic grievances against the government and ruling classes. This section will examine how those grievances were generated in Sierra Leonean society.

Legacy of British Colonial Rule

The modern history of Sierra Leone goes back to 1787, when the Black Poor, mostly former soldiers from the British army, settled on the northern end of the Sierra Leone peninsula. After the area of Freetown and its environs became a Crown Colony of Britain in 1808, Sierra Leone was used as a principal navy base for a British anti-slavery squadron operating in western African waters (TRC 2004; Richards 1996). Then later in 1896, as the remainder of the territory of modern Sierra Leone was declared a Protectorate of Britain, British colonial rule, which was based on a separate and disparate development of the two areas, started to take its shape (TRC 2004). The British colonial investment in Sierra Leone concentrated on the Crown Colony and its predominant residents – i.e. the Krios. For instance, the disparities between the Colony and the Protectorate were conspicuous in the field of education; although the vast majority of Sierra Leone territories and population belonged to the Protectorate,[iii] half of the primary schools were located in the Colony in 1947, and it was mostly the Krios who were the beneficiaries of higher education (TRC 2004).

The discriminatory aspects of the colonial period resulted from and were strengthened by the British tradition of indirect rule. Britain recognised only the Crown Colony as part of the British Empire while dividing the Protectorate into many small ‘chiefdoms’ and then controlling them indirectly. Under this rule, instead of establishing a strong centralised bureaucracy, the colonial government allowed the most important chiefs, known as Paramount Chiefs, to have considerable power – i.e. ‘decentralized despotism,’ a term coined by Mamdani (1996).  Under British protection, the chieftaincy became a lifetime and inheritable position, and the chiefs played principal roles in local economic development and exerted real authority over the indigenous population by enforcing their customary rights (Keen 2003; Denov 2010; Peters 2011).

Competition for the office of paramount chiefs was intense and violent among rival ruling families due to the economic rewards that they would receive once appointed as the chief (Keen 2005). Yet tension in rural communities was not only caused by this rivalry between ruling families but also by the discontent of rural population at the chiefs’ abuses including ‘excessive cash levies, unpopular land allocations, forced labour, and the punishment of dissenters’ (Keen 2005, p. 10). Systematically, the chieftaincy was established upon excluding women, youth, and the poor since each paramount chief was elected from ruling family members by an electoral college of councillors composed of twenty taxpayers (Denov 2010). Being neither citizens nor subject in this system (Fanthorpe 2001), those excluded under British indirect rule became more marginalised during the post-colonial period, and particularly Sierra Leone youth in rural area was the primary victim in the marginalising process.

The indirect rule of Britain failed to comprehend these dynamics at the local level, thereby letting the colonial government appoint or maintain autocratic chiefs who only served the interests of the British and themselves. As a result, this policy ‘helped to lay the foundations for the later failure of the state in rural areas’ (Peters 2011, p. 38). After the independence, the resentment against chiefdom administrative staff further increased as new chiefs were directly appointed by the central government and more local population were alienated by the decision-making process in their own communities. While commenting that this situation ‘had created [potential] recruits for the RUF’, one Paramount Chief from Moyamba District said:

“Chieftaincy is older than this current form of administration. […] [After the independence] the chiefs were molested and disgraced and reduced to nothing, and so could not control their people. And so many chiefs were created, which did not have popular support. Some of the chiefs who enjoyed the favour of the government ruled very adversely, abused and molested their subjects and connived with the administration, particularly under the APC, to intimidate and vandalise civilians and villages (Keen 2005, p. 20).”

State Collapse & the Destruction of Patrimonial Society

The Sierra Leone political system in its post-independence era demonstrates the characteristics of a ‘shadow state’. A shadow state, with its origin in dealing with illicit mining activities, reveals ‘the construction by rulers of a parallel political authority to manage the diamond sector in the wake of the near total decay of formal state institutions’ (Reno 1995, cited in Peters 2011, p. 40). With the connivance of the British, the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) distributed diamond mining licenses to party loyalists in the late 1950s (Reno 2003b). The shadow state, however, started to grow even more enormously under the All People’s Congress (APC) which ruled Sierra Leone from 1968 to 1992 (Peters 2011).

Siaka Stevens, who was the prime minister (1968-1971) and then the first president of Sierra Leone (1971-1985) under the APC regime, and his Sierra Leone-born Lebanese partner, Jamil Said Mohammed, gained  control of ‘the state diamond marketing monopoly in 1976 in a bogus privatization exercise’, enabling them to earn up to 300 million dollars (at 2001 prices) in diamond revenues. Not being satisfied, Stevens extended his privatization projects to ‘state agencies for agricultural marketing, road transport, and oil refining’ (Reno 2003b, p. 56). Instead of leading to an efficient and competitive market, though, the privatisation process under the leadership of Stevens merely contributed to increasing his own fortune as well as his key political allies’ wealth, ‘by using government control over import/export licenses and over the allocation of foreign exchange to favour his own clients’ (Keen 2003, p. 75).

The characteristics of a shadow state were further strengthened by the patrimonial principles which had upheld Sierra Leone society for a long time. Base on the principles ‘involve[ing] redistributing national resources as marks of personal favour to followers who respond with loyalty to the leader rather than to the institution the leader presents’, Stevens also behaved as ‘the ultimate leader of the Sierra Leone patrimonial system’ (Richards 1996, p. 34). For instance, he offered a number of benefits to the army officers, in particular to senior commanders, to buy off their loyalties (Keen 2003), but he did not finance the army for improving its fighting capacity. There were no proper training and weapons provided to the army for the fear that a well-equipped army could threaten his power. Rather he subordinated the army as a political instrument by ‘transform[ing] the Army Chief of Staff into a Member of Parliament in 1974’ (TRC 2004, p. 26). This patrimonial generosity soon resulted in the deficit of government budget, though, while leaving the rank and file unpaid (Keen 2003). Unfortunately, the weakening of the army both by not being paid and trained made the state system more vulnerable to rebellions.

Even after Stevens’ peaceful hand-over of power to Joseph Momoh in 1985, the situation went worse. With government being almost bankrupt, it became impossible to pay most civil servants (Reno 2003a). To overcome the lack of state resources by receiving IMF financial support, Momoh’s government pursued strict austerity measures such as reducing subsidies in petrol and food. This departure from the previous patronage system led to major budget cuts on health and education (Keen 2003). For instance, during the 1974/75 fiscal year, 15.6 percent of government expenditure was spent on education; but, this was reduced to 8.5 in the 1988/89 fiscal year (Abdullah 1998), then even plummeting to an all-time low 3 percent in 1993 (Karimu 1995, cited in Reno 2003a). This budget cut in education severely affected the salaries of teachers and the number of students: ‘many schools and colleges were closed because of the non-payment of salaries to teachers’ and, by 1987, less than 30 percent of children of secondary school age were registered in school (Davies 1996, cited in Keen 2003, p. 80). Considering the economic and social privileges that Freetown had enjoyed from its colonial times, these budget cuts had presumably hit urban areas much harder, which explain why we cannot simply regard the rebellion movement of the RUF as a rural uprising. This will be further examined in Section IV.

State collapse eventually led to the destruction of the patrimonial system, further fuelled by ‘the collapse of raw materials prices on the international market’, the decline of the Cold War patronage system, and ‘the withdrawal of large foreign firms from Sierra Leone due to high levels of corruption and depleting deposits of minerals’ (Peters 2011, p. 45). The biggest victims of the patrimonial system collapse were, in fact, young people who were not able to be educated and employed in this deteriorating situation. To make things worse, President Momoh delivered a speech in the eastern district of Kailahun saying that education was not a right but a privilege and then, not surprisingly, the RUF promptly used his speech as ‘one of its justification to go to war’ (Peters 2011, p. 46).

Marginalised Youth

Shrinking opportunities for education apparently made the young generation increasingly marginalised from their society. According to Abdullah (1998), the number of students registered in secondary schools increased from 16,414 in 1969 to 96,709 in 1990. However, only about 60,000 were in paid employment by 1985, and the situation in job markets deteriorated; even university graduates found it difficult to secure jobs in the public sector by 1990, whilst the private sector was also rapidly downsizing.[iv] In this period or even before, many middle-class students and school drop-outs became associated with poorer alienated youths in urban areas. This created the general circumstances enabling student protest to move beyond campuses particularly in 1977 (Keen 2003).

Abdullah (1998, p. 207) underlines the lumpen culture in Sierra Leone which was created by ‘the largely unemployed and unemployable youths, mostly male, who live by their wits or who have one foot in what is generally referred to as the informal or underground economy’. The lumpenproletariat expanded as more numbers of secondary school dropouts and university graduates failed to find jobs and became marginalised from the privileged class (Abdullah 1998). However, the concept of lumpen does not clearly touch upon the real problems of marginalised youth in Sierra Leone since it neglects original causes of the emergence of the lumpenproletariat; instead, it merely focuses on their criminal behaviour or lack of ideology. As Fanthorpe (2001, p. 363) interestingly argues, ‘scholarship focusing on lumpen or secular sectarian agency only serves to emphasize the conflict’s apparent detachment from pre-war patterns of politics and identity’.

For those who left school and were still unemployed, there were no many options available except semi-subsistence agriculture, finding jobs in the urban informal sector or ‘trying one’s luck in the alluvial mining areas’ (Peters 2011, p. 53). However, the situation in rural areas was not much better than in urban sectors. Peters (2011) found it hard to distinguish between the analyses and motivations of former rival combatants; which groups they fought for – RUF or government(s) – was not a decisive factor. Many of them shared similar opinions in a rationale for participation in the war – i.e. political corruption and lack of education and jobs. The interview with one former RUF combatant, who ‘did not join the rebel completely voluntarily but neither was bluntly forced’, clearly shows the resentment of young people against the whole society and what they really wanted:

“They [the RUF] told us that they are fighting to overthrow the APC government because they exploited the people and were taking all the money to Europe to build mighty houses or buy luxurious cars and forgetting about the youth. We, the young people, do suffer a lot in this country. Greed and selfishness was another factor which made the rebel war come to Sierra Leone. Nobody was willing to help the young men, especially the politicians have no sympathy for the young men. […] Actually we were fighting for awareness and also to have justice in the country. […] We fought against bribery and corruption in the country. […] If I become the president I will make all the youth to be engaged in skill training to avoid [the] idleness that will create confusion or make people commit crimes. If you do that for the youth they will not be any problem in this country. The young men should be encouraged by providing them with jobs. I think that will make the country stable. If I have my tools I will not go round town just being idle. I will survive through my trade (Peters 2011, pp. 20-21).”

IV. The Formation of the RUF and Its Invasion in Sierra Leone

Despite the accumulated grievances throughout history, circumstantial factors do not directly trigger violence; there should be active protagonists who take advantage of these grievances by channelling them into the road to war. In Sierra Leone’s case, the main protagonist was the RUF which had been militarily assisted by Charles Taylor from Liberia. This section will, thus, examine how the RUF was established and assisted by external actors.

Foday Sankoh and Founding Members of the RUF

Although the sole name of Foday Sankoh is widely known by the public, the RUF was actually founded by three Sierra Leoneans who received a military training together in Libya in 1987-88: Foday Sankoh, Abu Kanu and Rashid Mansaray. The rebels’ atrocious behaviour against civilians during the war does not necessarily illustrate their initial motivation to start the war. Therefore, the process of the formation of the RUF and the roles of all these three founders need to be analysed to better understand the original characteristics of the rebel group.

Foday Sankoh joined the army in 1956, and then was jailed from 1971 to 1978 after having been convicted of failing to report the plot of John Bangura to overthrow the government (Gberie 2005). According to Abdullah (1998), Sankoh claimed to have participated in the 1977 student protest in Freetown; however, Abdulla definitely denied the possibility of Sankoh’s participation based on his own experience of having been actively involved in the demonstration. It is undeniable, that Sankoh had a sort of distant connection to the student movement. For he was allegedly recruited and trained by a member of the Pan-African Union (PANAFU), Ebiyemi Reader, who was active in Freetown in the late 1970s and then moved to Bo to build a revolutionary cell.[v] When Reader discovered Sankoh in Bo, Sankoh was working as an itinerant photographer. As a secondary school dropout, Sankoh was not familiar with any intellectual radicalism in his early years, but as he joined Ebiyemi’s group, he ‘started, for the first time, to acquaint himself with pan-Africanism’ (Abdullah 1998, p. 218).

It was in August 1987 that Sankoh left to Libya for insurgency training, where he met his future RUF co-founders, Kanu and Mansaray: as the PANAFU members, Kanu was also ‘a founding member of Future Shock club and a graduate of Njala University College’, and Rashid was ‘an activist from Freetown east end, who had left the country in 1986 to join the MPLA in the fight against UNITA in Angola’. Originally, the PANAFU congress discussed the issue of sending recruits to Libya on behalf of the organisation, but the majority was against the enterprise. Kanu and Mansaray were among those who were finally expelled from the union as a result of their support for the move to Libya. Once rejected by the PANAFU, the project became a matter of individual choice; in the end, there were three groups, not more than thirty five men, sent to Libya from July 1987 to January 1988 including Sankoh and the two former PANAFU members (Abdullah 1998, pp. 216-217 & 219).

In the beginning, the RUF was nothing but ‘a loose collection of individuals who had returned from military training in Bengahzi’ with a collective leadership of three: Sankoh, Kanu and Mansaray. The three travelled a lot in Sierra Leone and Liberia to recruit combatants and open a link with the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and eventually by 1989, they managed to make an informal deal with Charles Taylor to help him in return for his military assistance. Even though there is no specific evidence that ‘any Sierra Leonean took part in the initial NPFL attack on Nimba county in December 1989’, some RUF members, notably Kanu and Mansaray, allegedly participated in NPFL battles by November 1990 (Abdullah 1998, pp. 221-222).

The early insurgent force of the RUF was composed of three major groups: those who had military training in Libya, Sierra Leone residents in Liberia and NPFL fighters on loan to the RUF. Scholars provide different analysis with regard to the characteristics of these original forces, in particular to the first and second categories. Abdullah (1998, pp. 219-221) argues that a majority of them were lumpenproletariats and, thus, ‘this social composition of the invading force is significant in understanding the character of the RUF and the bush path to destruction’. On the other hand, Richards (1996) describes them as excluded intellectuals and economic exiles/refugees staying in Liberia. In addition to their early revenge-inspired attacks on some educational facilities, as Richards argues, their destruction of mines cannot be adequately explained by a lumpen culture or motivations of greed. Why did the RUF destroy a number of mines instead of running them for their own economic interests? Richards (1996, pp.25-27) interprets this abnormality as implying ‘a typical academic response’ to accumulated social discontents and the intellectual anger of excluded elites. Abdullah (1998, pp. 222-223), however, refutes Richards’ argument that he ‘totally neglects the centrality and dynamics of rebellious youth culture’, while insisting that the RUF rebels were neither radical nor excluded intellectuals.

Considering this controversy, it does not seem easy to track and determine the original character of the early RUF members since the rebel group included members from relatively diverse backgrounds. At least, however, the transformation in the RUF leadership reveals a certain useful aspect for further research on the early stage of the RUF insurgency. As mentioned above, the RUF maintained a collective leadership system before the civil war. Yet the three co-founders roughly agreed Sankoh would be the spokesperson for the group.[vi] His status as a spokesperson became later transformed into the RUF leader through his speeches for external audiences (Abdullah 1998).

As Sankoh consolidated his power in the group with the beginning of the war, he also started to eliminate his potential rivals – mostly educated radicals – within the group; the number executed was allegedly reported to have reached almost at 300 (Keen 2005). Among those executed, there were Kanu and Mansaray who founded the RUF with Sankoh; Kanu was executed in August 1992 for ‘failure to follow instructions and conniving with the enemy’, and Mansaray in the following November for ‘failure to defend a strategic position against the enemy.’ They could have endangered Sankoh’s position since both of them were regarded as the leading strategists and also popular among the RUF cadres (Abdullah 1998, pp. 226-227).

In addition, according to a former PANAFU member in the army, ‘the area under Kanu’s control was generally peaceful and well organised’ because ‘he reached out to explain what the RUF was about to the peasants, and was not engaged in unnecessary violence against civilians’. Mansaray’s second-in-command also confirmed that one of the reasons Mansaray was executed was his ‘opposition to the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians’ (Abdullah 1998, pp. 226-227). By these executions, as Pratt (1999) noted, ‘the radical intellectual roots of the RUF were extinguished in its first year of operation, and its brutal attacks on civilians stood in contradiction to its ostensible aim of creating a revolutionary egalitarian system’.

External Assistance

Though it was originally a civil war, the bloody conflict in Sierra Leone was also closely intertwined with varied external factors prevalent in West African politics. First, as widely known through the recent conviction of Taylor, the civil war in Sierra Leone cannot be explained separately from the Liberian civil war. Although some of the charges could have been exaggerated by the Sierra Leone government for its sake during the war and repeated by the media without thorough consideration (Abdullah 1998), Talyor’s supplies of arms to the RUF and the participation of the NPFL in the Sierra Leone civil war are no longer controversial; in this context, it is significant to examine why Taylor decided to assist the RUF in waging the war.

Sankoh and Taylor are thought to have first met in Ghana in 1987 and then again in Libya in 1988, but it is uncertain how seriously Taylor regarded Sankoh at that point. In 1989, Taylor, who had already secured his forces, visited Freetown to request the endorsement of President Momoh for ‘the use of Sierra Leone as a base to launch his armed insurgency’ in Liberia. His request was, however, rejected summarily and, to make things worse, he was detained at Pandemba Road prison (Gberie 2005, p. 54). This episode seems likely to have affected his perception of the Momoh administration negatively, and probably made him realise the significance of having pro-NPFL regimes in neighbouring countries. Furthermore, once the Liberian civil started on Christmas Eve in 1989, the Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) established an intervention force called ECOMOG (the ECOWAS Monitoring Group) in a hurry, and Sierra Leone joined this force by dispatching 300 soldiers. It was not surprising that Taylor, the main rebel leader at that time, was strongly against the external intervention and vowed to fight it. Notably, the domestic opinion in Sierra Leone was not much in favour of Momoh’s initiative either since the ECOMOG intervention was partly considered as ‘an attempt to frustrate a popular uprising against a soldier-turned-politician’ (Gberie 2005, pp. 55-56).[vii] Also, given that the border region between Sierra Leone and Liberia was abundant in resources, including diamonds, a deeply destabilised Sierra Leone could have been Taylor’s interest in economic terms (Richards 1996).

There is another major external factor which should not be disregarded: that is Libya. In light of the early influence of Gaddafi’s Green Book on Sierra Leone students’ movement and, more practically, the military training offered to the three co-founders of the RUF in Benghazi, it is obvious that the Libya connection laid the foundation for the emergence of the RUF. Yet it is controversial how deeply Libya was involved in assisting the RUF except providing the military training programmes to Sierra Leone rebels. Richards (1996, p. 20) argues that Gaddafi could not go beyond ‘retain[ing] some residual sympathy for the RUF as one of the more sincere African attempts to apply aspects of his youth-oriented revolutionary philosophy’ because of his own problems with the sub-Saharan venture. However, Berman (2001) suggests a different point of view: some copies of the letters allegedly written by Sankoh show that, in the mid 1990’s, Libya provided the RUF the funds to purchase weapons. He also refers to evidence that they shipped and airdropped weapons to the rebels. Nonetheless, it is unclear whether Gaddafi made a pledge of support for the military activities of the RUF before the rebels invaded in Sierra Leone.

Civil wars cannot occur only by receiving external support; however, the Sierra Leone civil war might not have happened in 1991 had the RUF failed to acquire the minimum external assistance necessary to take an action. At the same time, though, the availability of external support limited the domestic support necessary to win the war in the long term. As Reno (2003b, p. 60) asserts, this external support ‘reduced the RUF rebel’s incentives to rely upon popular support in Sierra Leone to survive’, and it allowed, at least in part, the RUF’s atrocious behaviour against its own civilians during the war.

V. Conclusion

The war finally began on March 23 1991 when the RUF entered Kailahun District and Pujehun District in Sierra Leone from Liberia, and as we all know, thousands of innocent civilians suffered and were killed by both parties – government soldiers and rebels – during the eleven-year war. Despite the gravity of those war crimes, we should be careful not to judge the causes of the war simply based on the process and outcomes of the war. This paper, thus, questioned the conventional belief that diamonds were the main driver of the war, and then explored the broader political and societal context of Sierra Leone and the RUF’s history before the war.

The Sierra Leone civil war was the result of varied interactions between structural problems in Sierra Leone society which increased grievances among people and, accordingly, led to the emergence of the RUF. Although diamonds seemingly played a significant role in financing the war once it started, diamonds more likely contributed to corrupting state institutions in the pre-war period, thereby increasing grievance, rather than directly triggering the conflict. The problems of marginalised youth following the collapse of patrimonial society were also serious issues: without proper education and employment, many young people were left vulnerable to be easily recruited to the rebel forces. Lastly, the RUF was not merely mindless and violent bandits without any legitimate political cause as widely believed. The early co-leadership reveals some roots of radical student movements in the earlier period, and by successfully eliminating these roots, Sankoh consolidated his power and conducted the war in his own ruthless way.

Bibliography

Abdullah, I 1998, ‘Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 203-235.

Bates, RH 2008, When things fell apart: state failure in late-century Africa, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Bangura, Y 2004, ‘The political and cultural dynamics of the Sierra Leone War’, in I Abdullah (ed.) Between democracy and terror: the Sierra Leone Civil War, UNISA Press, Pretoria.

Berman, EG 2001, ‘Arming the Revolutionary United Front’, African Security Review, vol. 10, no. 1,http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/asr/10no1/Berman.html [accessed May 12 2012].

BBC, “Charles Taylor guilty: judges excerpts,” April 26 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17852488 [accessed April 29 2012].

Collier, P 2000, ‘Doing well out of war: an economic perspective’, in M Berdal and DM Malone (ed.), Greed & grievance: economic agendas in civil wars, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder.

Collier, P & Hoeffler, A 2004, ‘Greed and grievance in civil war’, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 56, pp.563-595.

Davies, R 1996, ‘The Sierra Leone situation: the spill-over of the Liberian civil war into Sierra Leone: peace-making and peace-keeping possibilities,” report, UN Institute for Training and Research/International Peace Academy, New York.

Denov, M 2010, Child solders: Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Fearon, JD 2005, ‘Primary commodity exports and civil war’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 4, pp. 483-507.

Fanthorpe, R 2001, ‘Neither Citizen nor Subject? ‘Lumpen’ Agency and the Legacy of Native Administration in Sierra Leone’, African Affairs, vol. 100, issue 400, pp.363-386.

Gberie, L 2005, A dirty war in West Africa: The RUF and the destruction of Sierra Leone, Indiana University Press, Bloomington.

Kamara, I 2000, The Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations (UN), His speech in the UN Security Council (2000), cited in LA Times, ‘U.N. imposes ban on Sierra Leone diamonds’, http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jul/06/news/mn-48544 [accessed May 15 2012].

Kaplan, RD 1994, ‘The coming anarchy: how scarcity, crime, overpopulation and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet’,Atlantic Monthly.

2001, The coming anarchy: shattering the dreams of the post Cold War, Vintage Books, New York.

Karimu, J 1995, Government budget and economic and financial policies for the financial year 1995/1996, Government of Sierra Leone, Freetown.

Keen, D 2003, ‘Greedy Elites, Dwindling Resources, Alienated Youths: The Anatomy of Protracted Violence in Sierra Leone’, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, vol. 2, http://www.fes.de/ipg/IPG2_2003/ARTKEEN.HTM [accessed April 28 2012].

2005, Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone, Palgrave Macmillan, Oxford.

2008, Complex emergencies, Polity, Cambridge.

Lujala P, Gleditsch NP & Gilmore E 2005, ‘A diamond curse?: civil war and a lootable resource,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 49, no. 4, pp.538-62.

Mamdani, M 1996, Citizen and subject: contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Peters, K 2011, War and the crisis of youth in Sierra Leone, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Pratt, D 1999, ‘Sierra Leone: the forgotten crisis,” Report to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, P.C., M.P. from David Pratt, M.P., Nepean-Carleton, Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1999/crisis-e.htm[accessed May 5 2012].

Reno, W 1995, Corruption and state politics in Sierra Leone, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

2003a, ‘Sierra Leone: warfare in a post-state society’, in RI Rotberg (ed.), State failure and state weakness in a time of terror, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.

2003b, ‘Political networks in a failing state: the roots and future of violent conflict in Sierra Leone,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, vol. 2, http://www.fes.de/ipg/IPG2_2003/ARTRENO.HTM [accessed April 29 2012].

Richards, P 1996, Fighting for the rain forest: war, youth & resources in Sierra Leone, Heinemann, Portsmouth.

Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 2004, Witness to truth: report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, vol. 3B, http://www.sierra-leone.org/Other-Conflict/TRCVolume3B.pdf [accessed May 16 2012].

Stohl, R 2000, Center for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/document.cfm?DocumentID=651&IssueID=93&StartRow=1&ListRows=10&appendURL=&Orderby=DateLastUpdated&ProgramID=23&issueID=93[accessed May 6 2012].

Williamson, J 2006, ‘The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers: social and psychological transformation in Sierra Leone’,Intervention: The International Journal of Mental Health, Psychosocial Work and Counselling in Areas of Armed Conflict, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 185-205.


[i] There is no clear explanation in Williamson’s article about why almost half of missing children was reported in a single year of 1999. Presumably, it was because of the RUF’s ‘Operation No Living Thing’ in 1999 in which thousands of innocent civilians in Freetown was murdered and raped. Many children were also reported missing and likely abducted by the RUF. See more details about ‘Operation No Living Thing’ in Denov (2010: 74-76) and Gberie (2005: chapter 6).

[ii] One of those journalists is Robert D. Kaplan (1994; 2001), and Paul Richards (1996) criticises Kaplan’s argument as ’New Barbarianism’.

[iii] ‘The Crown Colony was not more than 200 square miles. The Protectorate, on the other hand, extended some 182 miles from West to East, and 210 miles from North to South. The Colony had only about sixty thousand people by the end of the colonial period, while the Protectorate had about two million people.’ (TRC 2004, p. 6)

[iv] The author did not state further details. More quantitative data concerning unemployment rate in Sierra Leone is difficult to find in other sources.

[v] The PANAFU was launched as a radical student group at Forah Bay University in the early 1980s.

[vi] It is not clear why Sankoh assumed the job of spokesman in the beginning. Presumably, it may have been related to the fact that he was much older than other RUF members. When the war broke out, he was already 53 years old.

[vii] ‘The ECOMOG peace-keeping forces in Liberia were dominated by the Nigerians. Presidents Momoh was a close friend of Nigeria’s military leader, General Babangida, and Freetown served as an important base for ECOMOG.’ (Richards 1996, p. 19)


Written by: Se Young Jang
Written at: Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies
Written for: Gareth Austin
Date written: May 2012

BBC Africa debate

BBC Africa

This week BBC Newsday will look at what the newest discoveries of oil, gas and coal will do for Africa’s development. Today we are in Mozambique visiting the site of a new coal mine project and power station. Do you think Africa’s next generation will benefit from the continent’s natural resources? Listen live at 0300-0830BST http://bbc.in/WSlive

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RPT-AFRICA MONEY-Mozambique’s cashews get dose of Dutch disease | News by Country | Reuters

By Marina Lopes

MAPUTO, Sept 21 (Reuters) – Mozambique’s cashew industry is ailing, and the symptoms point to a bad bout of “Dutch disease.”

In a nutshell, this illness strikes an economy when the discovery of a resource such as oil draws in a flood of dollars, boosting the local currency but making all other exports uncompetitive.

The term was coined to explain the decline of manufacturing in the Netherlands after the discovery of North Sea oil and gas in the late 1950s.

In Mozambique’s case, an investment boom in the nascent coal and gas sectors hoisted the metical by a whopping 33 percent against the dollar from September 2010 to the end of 2011. It has since held on to the bulk of those gains.

Foreign direct investment soared to $2.1 billion last year – when the metical was the top-performing currency against the dollar – compared with just $7.8 million in 2010, central bank data showed.

While the government will welcome the money, it has crushed any cashew comeback and put the livelihood of tens of thousands of peasant farmers at risk in a country where agriculture still accounts for a third of gross domestic product.

The tropical southeast African nation and former Portuguese colony was once the world’s top producer of the coveted nuts, but – as with most of its economy – the industry was gutted when civil war erupted after independence in 1975.

The end of conflict two decades ago allowed the cashew sector to sprout anew, and in 2010, sales rose to a post-war peak of 113,000 tonnes, the third-highest in Africa behind Ivory Coast and Guinea-Bissau, according to the Ghana-based African Cashew Alliance.

But sales then tumbled to 63,000 tonnes last year.

Market and industry players say the currency’s appreciation prompted buyers in India, where most of Mozambique’s cashews are processed, to search for cheaper options elsewhere.

“Prices last year got to all time highs and that really hurts demand,” said Richard Rosenblatt, of the Richard Franco Agency, a U.S.-based nut broker.

Oil-rich Angola, another former Portuguese colony on the other side of Africa, also highlights the impact of Dutch disease on agriculture.

Before independence in 1975 and the chaos of its civil war, Angola was the world’s fourth-largest coffee producer, churning out 200,000 tonnes of beans a year.

Now, a decade after the fighting ended, it is vying with Nigeria to be Africa’s biggest oil producer, while its coffee industry remains in a rut with annual output of a paltry 4,000 tonnes.

One solution being explored in Mozambique is to process its cashew nuts at home.

“The cashew nut is consumed externally so it is the international price that dictates things,” said Filomena Maiopue, director of the National Cashew Institute in the capital, Maputo.

“We’ve reached the conclusion, in discussion with the Ministry of Agriculture, that in order to minimize that effect, we need to intensify local processing,” said Maiopue.

Even if the government does get its act together, there is little immediate relief in store for farmers as money continues to pour in from mining giants such as Brazil’s Vale to develop the Mozambique’s vast coal fields.

Joaquin Solomon Nhantumo, a farmer in southern Mozambique, has been forced him to grow lettuce and tomatoes in his back-yard orchard to provide for himself and his eight children.

But he says there is only one crop that will keep him in business in the long run.

“The cashew nut is our sole means of survival.” (Additional reporting and writing by Ed Stoddard; Editing by Hugh Lawson)

via RPT-AFRICA MONEY-Mozambique’s cashews get dose of Dutch disease | News by Country | Reuters.

via RPT-AFRICA MONEY-Mozambique’s cashews get dose of Dutch disease | News by Country | Reuters.

Africa, oil and the West: Show us the money | The Economist

BARELY a month goes by without a new oil discovery in Africa. Only five of the continent’s 55 countries are neither producing nor exploring for oil. Most places are also extracting lots of lucrative minerals. A resource bonanza is in train across the continent, generating big government revenues and real benefits for Africans. Road networks are expanding, public services are improving. But most of this happens behind a veil of secrecy. Money sloshes out of public scrutiny at the insistence of officials and politicians who prefer it that way.

Even if squeaky-clean Western multinationals are involved, transparency over payments for resources is minimal. Ordinary people can rarely find out how much goes into government kitties. That makes it easier for insiders to line their pockets. Monitoring groups say corruption has been rising. Ministerial car parks are filled with the fanciest limousines. A lot of money still reaches public budgets, but without oversight it is often badly spent. Many new roads go nowhere or are barely used; shiny new hospitals are often understaffed.

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The resulting frustration can trigger violence. In Angola, Africa’s second-biggest oil producer, activists have been demanding a fairer distribution of revenues; the government has responded with a bloody crackdown (see article). South Africa has just seen the worst disturbances since the apartheid era, with 34 platinum miners shot dead during a wildcat strike. Resources can also fuel international conflicts. The two Sudans went to the brink of war earlier this year over oil.

African governments have become more democratic and better at delivering services. Yet the combination of rising mineral wealth and continuing poverty is explosive. After decades of misrule, even the most competent officials are often suspected of pinching funds. More transparency is what is needed to ensure that resource wealth is used better and distributed more fairly. Much of Angola’s income is managed by a national oil company that is shielded from oversight by commercial secrecy. The oil revenues of Equatorial Guinea, where three-quarters of the population live below the poverty line, are a state secret. This is both wrong and dangerous.

The challenge for Western firms and governments is how to help African citizens wheedle data out of their governments so as to hold them more to account. A decade ago Britain’s Tony Blair had a go, promoting the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. As many as three dozen countries, in Africa and elsewhere, agreed to publish details of payments from oil and mining companies. But the scheme was voluntary; the worst offenders either refused to join or dragged their feet.

Follow America’s lead

America’s Securities and Exchange Commission has now come up with a set of rules. The 1,100 resource companies listed on American stock exchanges, which make up half the global industry by value, will be required to publish all payments to foreign governments above $100,000. The European Union is talking of introducing similar requirements. It should do so.

Some Western investors say such rules involve costly red tape. Without some hidden payments to officials, business will be lost, they add. Divulging the details of every deal will give secrets away to competitors. Moreover, non-Western companies, especially Chinese ones, will gain an advantage because they will escape such scrutiny.

The bureaucratic cost will not be large, since companies will merely have to make public figures that are currently held privately. And some Chinese firms will find themselves subject to similar requirements, because many are, or plan to be, listed in America. Moreover, if the West changes its behaviour, China may too. After years of claiming that, unlike Western imperialists, it supports Africa’s people, not its dictators, it may feel it has to back the publication of data about payments.

But there is no guarantee that China will see the light; and, in the meantime, Western companies are likely to find themselves at a disadvantage. So be it. Western countries already spend money and political capital on trying to promote democracy, encourage development and discourage corruption in Africa. Helping Africa use its mineral wealth to achieve those ends is worth paying a price for.

via Africa, oil and the West: Show us the money | The Economist.

via Africa, oil and the West: Show us the money | The Economist.

Energy price shocks: sweet and sour consequences for developing countries – Resources – Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

Energy price shocks: sweet and sour consequences for developing countries

ODI Working Papers 355, August 2012

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Authors: Nicola Cantore with Alessandro Antimiani and Paulo Rui Anciaes

This paper discusses the effects of recent energy price changes on developing countries. It reviews the transmission channels between energy prices and growth and distribution in developing countries based on the most recent literature; employs a computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to identify the most vulnerable countries; and presents three brief country case studies analysing policy responses to oil shocks in more detail (Nigeria, Malawi and Ghana).

ISBN: 978 1 907288 84 5

Published by ODI as part of the ODI Working Papers series.

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This Working�Paper discusses the effects of recent energy price changeson developing countries. The study examines energy price shocks and focuses on:

The transmission channels linking energy prices to growth in developing countries based on the most recent literature;

a mapping exercise identifying the most vulnerable countries using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model; and

three brief country case studies analysing policy responses to oil shocks in more detail. The recent experience in Nigeria, where energy subsidies were removed, suggests it is important to examine individual cases in more depth, including the political incentives.

Many developing countries are already putting in place policy responses to reduce their dependence on oil (e.g. energy conservation, diversification) but, as these case studies�of Nigeria, Malawi and Ghana show, long-term commitment to such policies outside the political and/or electoral cycle, government effectiveness, real independence of regulatory bodies and technical skills of decision makers need to be in place for the successful implementation of appropriate actions to reduce vulnerability or cope with oil price increases.

Policies to cope with oil price crises include the strengthening of refinery capacity for countries with oil endowments, interventions promoting a structural change towards green sources of energy, the creation of strategic petroleum reserves and hedging strategies.

The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the determinants and impacts of oil price shocks based on the literature and recent evidence of oil price changes. Section 3 examines the possible effects in more detail using the GTAP E model. Section 4 includes a number of case studies with a focus on the impact of energy price shocks, policy responses and analysis of the facts in these countries. Section 5 concludes by drawing policy implications.

via Energy price shocks: sweet and sour consequences for developing countries – Resources – Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

via Energy price shocks: sweet and sour consequences for developing countries – Resources – Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

Moçambique: a maldição da abundância? | Brasil de Fato

Moçambique: a maldição da abundância? | Brasil de Fato.

 

via Moçambique: a maldição da abundância? | Brasil de Fato.

Moçambique: a maldição da abundância?
acima cabeçalho | Análise
As grandes multinacionais, algumas bem conhecidas dos latino-americanos, estão se apoderando das riquezas de Moçambique

26/07/2012

Boaventura de Sousa Santos

A “maldição da abundância” é uma expressão usada para caracterizar os riscos que correm os países pobres onde se descobrem recursos naturais objeto de cobiça internacional. A promessa de abundância decorrente do imenso valor comercial dos recursos e dos investimentos necessários para o concretizar é tão convincente que passa a condicionar o padrão de desenvolvimento econômico, social, político e cultural.

Os riscos desse condicionamento são, entre outros: crescimento do PIB em vez de desenvolvimento social; corrupção generalizada da classe política que, para defender os seus interesses privados, se torna crescentemente autoritária para se poder manter no poder, agora visto como fonte de acumulação primitiva de capital; aumento em vez de redução da pobreza; polarização crescente entre uma pequena minoria super-rica e uma imensa maioria de indigentes; destruição ambiental e sacrifícios incontáveis às populações onde se encontram os recursos em nome de um “progresso” que estas nunca conhecerão; criação de uma cultura consumista que é praticada apenas por uma pequena minoria urbana mas imposta como ideologia a toda a sociedade; supressão do pensamento e das práticas dissidentes da sociedade civil sob o pretexto de serem obstáculos ao desenvolvimento e profetas da desgraça. Em suma, os riscos são que, no final do ciclo da orgia dos recursos, o país esteja mais pobre econômica, social, política e culturalmente do que no seu início. Nisto consiste a maldição da abundância.

Depois das investigações que conduzi em Moçambique entre 1997 e 2003 visitei o país várias vezes. Da visita que acabo de fazer colho uma dupla impressão que a minha solidariedade com o povo moçambicano transforma em dupla inquietação. A primeira tem precisamente a ver com a orgia dos recursos naturais. As sucessivas descobertas (algumas antigas) de carvão (Moçambique é já o sexto maior produtor de carvão a nível mundial), gás natural, ferro, níquel, talvez petróleo anunciam um El Dorado de rendas extrativistas que podem ter um impacto no país semelhante ao que teve a independência. Fala-se numa segunda independência. Estarão os moçambicanos preparados para fugir à maldição da abundância? Duvido.

As grandes multinacionais, algumas bem conhecidas dos latino-americanos, como a Rio Tinto (Austrália) e a brasileira Vale do Rio Doce (Vale Moçambique) exercem as suas atividades com muito pouca regulação estatal, celebram contratos que lhe permitem o saque das riquezas moçambicanas com mínimas contribuições para o orçamento de estado (em 2010 a contribuição foi de 0,04%), violam impunemente os direitos humanos das populações onde existem recursos, procedendo ao seu reassentamento (por vezes mais de um num prazo de poucos anos) em condições indignas, com o desrespeito dos lugares sagrados, dos cemitérios, dos ecossistemas que têm organizado a sua vida desde há dezenas ou centenas de anos.

Sempre que as populações protestam são brutalmente reprimidas pelas forças policiais e militares. A Vale é hoje um alvo central das organizações ecológicas e de direitos humanos pela sua arrogância neocolonial e pelas cumplicidades que estabeleceu com o governo. Tais cumplicidades assentam por vezes em perigosos conflitos de interesses, entre os interesses do país governado pelo Presidente Guebuza e os interesses das empresas do empresário Guebuza donde podem resultar graves violações dos direitos humanos como quando o ativista ambiental Jeremias Vunjane, que levava consigo para a Conferência da ONU, Rio+20, denúncias dos atropelos da Vale, foi arbitrariamente impedido de entrar no Brasil e deportado (e só regressou depois de muita pressão internacional), ou quando, às organizações sociais é pedida uma autorização do governo para visitar as populações reassentadas como se estas vivessem sob a alçada de um agente soberano estrangeiro.

São muitos os indícios de que as promessas dos recursos começam a corromper a classe política de alto a baixo e os conflitos no seio desta são entre os que “já comeram “ e os que “querem também comer”. Não é de esperar que nestas condições, os moçambicanos no seu conjunto beneficiem dos recursos. Pelo contrário, pode estar em curso a angolanização de Moçambique. Não será um processo linear porque Moçambique é muito diferente de Angola: a liberdade de imprensa é incomparavelmente superior; a sociedade civil está mais organizada; os novos-ricos têm medo da ostentação porque ela zurzida semanalmente na imprensa e também pelo medo dos sequestros; o sistema judicial, apesar de tudo, é mais independente para atuar; há uma massa crítica de acadêmicos moçambicanos credenciados internacionalmente capazes de fazer análises sérias que mostram que “o rei vai nu”.

A segunda impressão/inquietação, relacionada com a anterior, consiste em verificar que o impulso para a transição democrática que observara em estadias anteriores parece estancado ou estagnado. A legitimidade revolucionária da Frelimo sobrepõe-se cada vez mais à sua legitimidade democrática (que tem vindo a diminuir em recentes atos eleitorais) com a agravante de estar agora a ser usada para fins bem pouco revolucionários; a partidarização do aparelho de estado aumenta em vez de diminuir; a vigilância sobre a sociedade civil aperta-se sempre que nela se suspeita dissidência; a célula do partido continua a interferir com a liberdade acadêmica do ensino e investigação universitários; mesmo dentro da Frelimo, e, portanto, num contexto controlado, a discussão política é vista como distração ou obstáculo ante os benefícios indiscutidos e indiscutíveis do “desenvolvimento”. Um autoritarismo insidioso disfarçado de empreendedorismo e de aversão à política (“não te metas em problemas”) germina na sociedade como erva daninha.

Ao partir de Moçambique, uma frase do grande escritor moçambicano Eduardo White cravou-se em mim e em mim ficou: “nós que não mudamos de medo por termos medo de o mudar” (Savana, 20-7-2012). Uma frase talvez tão válida para a sociedade moçambicana como para a sociedade portuguesa e para tantas outras acorrentadas às regras de um capitalismo global sem regras.

Boaventura de Sousa Santos é sociólogo e professor catedrático da Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra (Portugal).

Secteur minier : l’africanisation est en marche | Jeuneafrique.com – le premier site d’information et d’actualité sur l’Afrique

Secteur minier : l’africanisation est en marche | Jeuneafrique.com – le premier site d’information et d’actualité sur l’Afrique.

via Secteur minier : l’africanisation est en marche | Jeuneafrique.com – le premier site d’information et d’actualité sur l’Afrique.

 

11/02/2012 à 17h:40 Par Christophe Le Bec
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On ne compte pratiquement pas de sociétés minières privées africaines.On ne compte pratiquement pas de sociétés minières privées africaines. © Issouf Sanogo/AFP

Si les groupes miniers anglos-saxons restent dominants, de plus en plus d’entrepreneurs du continent investissent le secteur. A défaut de lancer leurs propres sociétés, ils accèdent à des postes stratégiques au sein des majors.

« Dans le secteur minier, nous sommes encore trop peu d’entrepreneurs originaires du continent à avoir lancé nos propres compagnies », regrette le Congolais Kalaa Mpinga, président de Mwana Africa. « Alors que dans certains pays les ressources minières sont les principales richesses [évaluées en RDC à 24 000 milliards de dollars, soit environ 18 500 milliards d’euros, NDLR], on ne compte pratiquement pas de sociétés minières privées africaines en dehors des marocaines ou des sud-africaines », déplore le patron, dont l’entreprise, fondée en 2003, réalise 31 millions d’euros de chiffre d’affaires dans l’or et le nickel en Afrique australe et en RD Congo.

Si les pays anglophones de tradition minière comptent quelques grands entrepreneurs tels le Ghanéen Sam Jonah, patron charismatique d’Ashanti Goldfields (fusionné avec AngloGold en 2004), ou le Sud-Africain Patrice Motsepe, président d’African Rainbow Minerals, ailleurs, ils se font rares. Mais les choses pourraient changer, avec l’africanisation des cadres du secteur, un mouvement lancé dans le sillage de la politique sud-africaine du Black Economic Empowerment visant à renforcer le poids des Noirs dans les entreprises. « Je vois de plus en plus d’Africains qui participent et gèrent de grands projets. Il y a une montée en puissance de décideurs locaux, c’est indéniable », observe l’avocat Thierry Lauriol, responsable des questions minières au sein du cabinet Jeantet.

Formations “maisons”

« Quand j’ai commencé à travailler dans le secteur, chez le sud-africain Randgold Resources, j’ai été l’un des premiers originaires du continent à être directeur pays, au Mali. Aujourd’hui, tous les titulaires des postes de ce niveau sont africains », observe le Sénégalais Aziz Sy, vice-président de la junior canadienne Oromin Explorations pour les opérations au Sénégal. « C’est dans l’intérêt des majors de faire émerger des cadres africains : ils connaissent le milieu et les rouages de l’administration… et puis ils coûtent moins cher ! » ajoute ce géologue formé à l’Institut des sciences de la terre de Dakar.

J’ai eu envie de créer ma compagnie. Mais il me manquait des compétences pour lever des fonds.

Aziz Syvice-président d’Oromin

Pour Igor Rochette, responsable en recrutement chez Michael Page pour le secteur minier, « certaines majors du secteur [comme Vale, BHP Billiton ou Rio Tinto] préfèrent souvent un cadre africain, quitte à être moins exigeantes sur certaines compétences, et misent ensuite sur des formations “maison”. Elles favorisent aussi leur mobilité, les envoyant dans leurs différentes filiales pour les faire monter en compétence », indique-t-il. « Chez Vale, en 2009, il n’y avait que six responsables africains au sein de la direction Afrique australe et pas un seul directeur général. Aujourd’hui, nous sommes deux directeurs généraux et treize responsables de secteur mozambicains », se félicite Amado Mabasso, directeur général en charge des activités support pour le groupe brésilien à Maputo, qui doit être prochainement envoyé en formation au Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Reste que, entre cette africanisation de l’encadrement des groupes internationaux et l’émergence de sociétés locales, il y a un grand pas. « La prépondérance des sociétés étrangères dans le secteur minier perdure, car elles ont les financements et la technologie. Les intérêts africains se manifestent dans la prise de permis, mais ils recherchent ensuite très vite des partenaires. Il faudra du temps pour voir émerger des champions continentaux », estime Me Lauriol.

Gisement gelés

« Malheureusement, les entrepreneurs miniers africains s’aventurent bien souvent sans connaître les bases du métier. Certains détenteurs de permis, inconscients de la valeur de leurs titres, se font rouler par des juniors venues de l’étranger, leur revendant leurs titres à des prix très bas au lieu de prendre le temps d’en évaluer la valeur », regrette Boubacar Bocoum, responsable de l’appui au secteur minier à la Banque mondiale. « Pis, certains gisements, pourtant prometteurs, restent gelés car leur détenteur n’a pas le réseau nécessaire ou la crédibilité dans le milieu », ajoute ce Malien, pour qui il est urgent d’améliorer les filières minières en Afrique francophone. « À l’instar de ce qu’ont fait les universités sud-africaines, mais aussi ghanéennes, dont les formations se sont étoffées, il faut des écoles reconnues à l’échelle internationale, moins nombreuses mais d’un meilleur niveau. » Pas seulement en géologie ou en ingénierie, mais aussi et surtout en matière financière. « Avec mon expérience chez Randgold Resources, Lonmin puis Oromin Explorations, où j’ai exercé des responsabilités opérationnelles, j’ai eu envie, moi aussi, de créer ma propre compagnie, indique Aziz Sy. Au Sénégal, il est relativement facile pour un ressortissant d’obtenir un permis. Mais pour réussir, il me manque des compétences ou un associé pour lever des fonds sur les marchés. Dans la filière aurifère, il faut des dizaines de millions de dollars pour lancer un projet… »

Les figures de Proue

Kalaa Mpinga, président exécutif de Mwana Africa

51 ans, congolais (RD Congo)

Originaire du Kasaï-Oriental et formé au Canada, il s’installe en 1997 à Johannesburg, où il rejoint la branche construction d’Anglo American. En 2003, il crée Mwana Africa, cotée à Londres. Présente dans l’or et le nickel en Afrique du Sud, au Zimbabwe, au Botswana et en RD Congo, la compagnie a une capitalisation boursière de plus de 40 millions d’euros.

Sam Jonah, ex-président non exécutif d’AngloGold Ashanti

61 ans, ghanéen

Entré chez Ashanti Goldfields comme ingénieur en 1979, ce géologue en est devenu le président en 1986. Il a été l’architecte de sa relance (portant la production de 240 000 onces d’or à 1,6 million d’onces par an) et a conduit la fusion avec AngloGold, donnant naissance en 2004 au premier groupe aurifère du continent, dont il est alors nommé président non exécutif. Il a démissionné en septembre dernier.

Patrice Motsepe, président exécutif d’African Rainbow Minerals

49 ans, sud-africain

Né à Soweto, ce self-made-man est à la tête d’une société dont le chiffre d’affaires atteignait 1,07 milliard d’euros en 2011. Critiqué pour ses liens avec le pouvoir, qui lui ont facilité l’obtention de permis, il est néanmoins respecté pour son sens des affaires et sa compréhension du secteur. Présent dans le platine, le fer et le charbon, il veut se développer à l’étranger.

Pour réussir, il manque en effet souvent aux Africains une capacité à se mettre en réseau avec les décideurs mondiaux, qui investissent à Toronto, Londres, Sydney… et, plus rarement, Johannesburg. « Si je n’avais pas gravi les échelons en Afrique du Sud, au sein d’Anglo American, dont je suis devenu, à 36 ans, le plus jeune administrateur et dont j’ai repris des gisements non stratégiques, je n’aurais jamais sauté le pas, explique Kalaa Mpinga, formé à l’université McGill de Montréal. Quand j’ai lancé Mwana Africa, j’ai pu lever 5 millions de dollars auprès de six grands investisseurs angolaiszimbabwéens et zambiens, avant d’aller à la Bourse de Londres. Jamais je n’aurais été suivi sans mes références, notamment en matière financière. »

Le développement du patronat africain serait-il une tendance émergente ? « Avec la peur du risque, la majorité des cadres préfère faire carrière dans les grands groupes, mais il y a quelques pionniers subsahariens francophones qui connaissent bien le secteur et vont au-delà de l’achat et de la revente de permis », estime Boubacar Bocoum. Pour lui, « ce sont des personnalités comme Kalaa Mpinga ou le Congolais Richard Ondoko qui font, avec leurs projets miniers, évoluer les mentalités. »À cette liste, on pourrait ajouter le Mauritanien Ahmed Baba Ould Azizi, le Sénégalais Ousmane Ndiaye ou l’ex-Premier ministre guinéen Kabiné Komara. Pour le responsable de la Banque mondiale, l’africanisation du patronat va nécessairement suivre celle des cadres du secteur, même si cela prendra du temps.

Seule solution pour accélérer ce processus : un appui politique fort des États du continent à leurs entrepreneurs. « Je ne connais aucune banque basée en Afrique qui accepte de financer des projets miniers. Les financements viendront toujours de l’extérieur, affirme Kalaa Mpinga. Mais pour limiter ce contrôle, les gouvernements ne doivent pas craindre de s’appuyer sur les actifs miniers pour imposer une part locale dans les capitaux des sociétés, et même d’en faciliter la prise de contrôle par des privés africains. » Un appel que le Sénégal, la Guinée ou la RD Congo, qui ont récemment modifié leur code minier en intégrant de telles mesures, ont entendu. Sur place, reste aux cadres africains du secteur, mieux formés et favorisés par les législations, à saisir les opportunités.

Lire l’article sur Jeuneafrique.com : Secteur minier : l’africanisation est en marche | Jeuneafrique.com – le premier site d’information et d’actualité sur l’Afrique 

Competitive Clientelism and Pockets of Efficiency in Mozambique, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda – DIIS

Competitive Clientelism and Pockets of Efficiency in Mozambique, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda – DIIS.

via Competitive Clientelism and Pockets of Efficiency in Mozambique, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda – DIIS.

The Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) has the pleasure of inviting you to a seminar in the fall seminar series on Elites, Production and Poverty (EPP):

Competitive Clientelism and Pockets of Efficiency in
Mozambique, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda

Monday, 5 December 2011, 14.00-16.00
Danish Institute for International Studies
Main Auditorium
Strandgade 71, ground floor, 1401 Copenhagen K

Background

How and why do ruling elites support productive sector initiatives – and what are the outcomes? This has been the main questions guiding the Elites, Production, and Poverty research on selected productive sectors in Mozambique, Uganda, Ghana, and Tanzania. These four countries have experienced prolonged periods of high growth within the last two decades. However, growth has not been accompanied by a structural transformation of the economy in terms of job creation or productivity increases. Rather, the economies remain caught in low-technology agriculture, with most of the growth being driven by aid and rapidly increasing services sectors. Why has growth not led to more employment and more productivity? The explanations are found in key features of the ruling coalition and the ruling elites in the four countries.

However, under certain conditions it is possible for the state to create pockets of efficiency in specific sectors ― also in competitive clientelist contexts. Ruling elites will support a sector if it helps them to remain in power. Supporting a sector may, in turn, help to fund the ruling coalition, or it may create election support in areas previously hostile to the ruling elite. Supporting a sector may also result from pressure from producers. Such successful cases of state interventions to support productive sector development will also be presented.

The presentation will subsequently be published in an expanded version as a DIIS working paper in the EPP sub-series.

Speakers

Anne Mette Kjær is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus. She is currently a visiting scholar at the Center for African Studies, University of Florida, and a member of the Elites, Production, and Poverty (EPP) research team. She has done research on public sector reforms, governance, state capacity and local government taxation in Uganda. She has published in journals such asPublic Administration and DevelopmentPublic Administration, and Forum for Development Studies.

Lars Buur is Senior Researcher at Danish Institute for International Studies. He is a member of the Elites, Production and Poverty (EPP) research team and is presently based at the Danish Embassy in Maputo in an exchange between DIIS and the RDE. Based on EPP research, he has published “Strategic Privatization: Rehabilitating the Mozambican Sugar Industry” with Carlota Mondlane and Obede Baloi in Review of African Political Economy (2011) and “The White Gold: The role of Government and State in Rehabilitating the Sugar Industry in Mozambique” in the Journal of Development Studies (forthcoming 2012) with Carlota Mondlane and Obede Baloi. A number of other EPP papers are under preparation.

Søren Davidsen is Chief Technical Adviser on governance in Danida. He has worked on governance issues, in particular public sector reform and anti-corruption, in several developing countries and emerging economies. Prior to taking up his assignment with Danida, Søren Davidsen
was governance adviser with the World Bank, working especially on Vietnam and Indonesia.

Programme

14.00-14.05       Introduction
                        Ole Therkildsen, Senior Researcher, DIIS

14.05-14.40       Competitive Clientelism and Pockets of Efficiency
in Mozambique, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda
                        Lars Buur, Senior Researcher, DIIS
Mette Kjær, Associate Professor, Aarhus University

14.40-14.50       Comments
                        Søren Davidsen, Chief Technical Adviser, Danida

14.50-15.00       Coffee Break

15.00-16.00       Open Discussion

Chair: Ole Therkildsen, Senior Researcher, DIIS

This is the final of seven seminars in the 2011 EPP Fall Seminar Series. These seminars deal with the conceptual tools needed to understand the political economy of economic growth, job creation and poverty alleviation and how these tools are applied to studies of state interventions in productive sectors in Bangladesh, Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Uganda. The main finding is that it is the motivation of political elites to support state interventions in productive sectors and mutual interests between these elites and producers that matters for good outcomes – rather than good governance, market driven development or empowerment of poor people.

For more information see the EPP research programme.

Practical Information

The seminar will be held in English.

Participation is free of charge, but registration is required. Please use below online registration form  no later than Fridag, 2 December 2011 at 12.00 noon.


Registration


Yes please, I would like to register for the DIIS event mentioned above:
Full Name, Organisation, and E-mail must be filled out. If a field is not filled out, the form cannot be sent

Please await confirmation by e-mail from DIIS for participation. If you have not received a confirmation from us within 2 workdays, please contact us directly, email:event@diis.dk or telephone +45 32 69 87 51.


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allAfrica.com: Africa: To Cook a Continent – Destructive Extraction And the Climate Crisis in Africa

allAfrica.com: Africa: To Cook a Continent – Destructive Extraction And the Climate Crisis in Africa. Africa: To Cook a Continent – Destructive Extraction And the Climate Crisis in Africa Nnimmo Bassey 3 November 2011 Email| Print| Comment Share: https://plusone.google.com/u/0/_/+1/fastbutton?url=http%3A%2F%2Fallafrica.com%2Fstories%2F201111040825.html&size=small&count=false&annotation=&hl=en-US&jsh=r%3Bgc%2F25095437-ce843676#id=I1_1320436294388&parent=http%3A%2F%2Fallafrica.com&rpctoken=168563524&_methods=onPlusOne%2C_ready%2C_close%2C_open%2C_resizeMe analysis In … Continue reading